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The ﬁscal decentralization impulse now sweeping the world often leads to partial decentraliza-
tion, where subnational governments are funded by central transfers, rather than leading to full
local autonomy. Despite the practical important of this arrangement, the literature contains
no economic analysis of a partial decentralization regime in a Tiebout-style model. This paper
provides such an analysis, relying on the key assumption that public-good provision requires
eﬀort on the part of government oﬃcials. By choosing diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort, localities can
then provide diﬀerent public-good levels even when a ﬁxed, common transfer constrains them




Under ﬁscal decentralization, subnational governments are granted autonomy in the pro-
vision and ﬁnancing of public goods. While subnational autonomy has long been a feature of
the ﬁscal environment in the United States and several other countries, a greater degree of
central control over the public sector is common elsewhere, especially in the developing world.
However, partly in response to advice from the World Bank and other international agencies,
many developing countries are seeking greater ﬁscal decentralization by attempting to real-
locate spending and taxing authority to subnational governments. This movement has been
motivated in part by the ideas of Tiebout (1956), who argued that local control of spending
allows the public sector to respond more eﬀectively to varied consumer preferences for public
goods.
Despite this impulse toward decentralization, an obstacle to the achievement of true local
autonomy in developing countries lies on the tax side. Even when spending authority is passed
downward to subnational governments, a lack of adequate tax capacity (especially at the local
level) often prevents these governments from funding expenditures out of their own revenues.
Instead, spending relies heavily on transfers from the central government. As explained by
Shah (2004),
... decentralization of taxing powers may not fully match the decentralization of ex-
penditure and regulatory functions... Revenue systems in developing and transition
economies are typically characterized by a large and dominant central government role
and a heavy reliance on indirect taxes such as VAT, excises, taxes on external trade
and fuel taxes... Local governments have very limited access to own source revenues
such as property taxes and user charges and even for these limited tax bases, they
typically have autonomy only with respect to rate setting within limits.
Reﬂecting limited own source revenues, ﬁgures presented by Shah and Shah (2006) show
that, in a sample of ten lower-income countries,1 local governments reliedon intergovernmental
transfers for 51% of their revenue, in contrast to a smaller transfer share of 34% for OECD
1countries. For some sample countries (Uganda, Poland, Brazil), the transfer share exceeded
65%. In a larger sample of developing countries analyzed by Shah (2004), 42% of subnational
revenue (local and provincial) came from transfers, with the share ranging from 75 to 95%
in Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa. Although Shah does not present
evidence on tax autonomy for his sample, a separate OECD study (1999) shows that, for one
his countries (Mexico), subnational governments had eﬀective control over only 14% of their
tax revenue, with all of this control occurring at the state rather than local level. This fact
suggests that limits on subnational autonomy may be even tighter than suggested by evidence
of a high reliance on transfers.
Despite their reliance on intergovernmental transfers and potentially limited tax autonomy,
subnational governments in Shah’s sample had eﬀective control over 58% of their expenditures.
Thus, developing countries appear to have more discretion in spending decisions than in the
raising of public revenue, which suggests that the usual models from the Tiebout tradition
should not be used to analyze their ﬁscal decentralizationexperiences. Instead, the appropriate
model may be one of “partial ﬁscal decentralization,” where spending authority is devolved
to the subnational level while ﬁnancing relies on transfers from the central government. The
purpose of the present paper is to propose and analyze such a model.
In the model, the central government levies a uniform head tax on each consumer and then
transfers the resulting revenue to local governments, which are the only subnational units. The
transfers are assumed to occur on a uniform per capita basis, perhaps reﬂecting a constitutional
requirement for equal treatment of all local governments. Since consumer incomes are identical
in the model, making regional equalization unnecessary, this uniformity assumption is natural.
Under partial decentralization, spending authority resides at the local level. But since local
tax revenue is nonexistent by assumption in the basic model, localities must rely entirely on
central transfers to ﬁnance their expenditures. In a standard setup, this arrangement would
allow localities no freedom whatsoever in setting public-good levels, which would be dictated
instead by the ﬁxed per capita transfer. However, a key feature of the model gives localities
discretion in the provision of public goods. In particular, the public-good cost function depends
not only on z, the level of the public good, but also on e, the “eﬀort” level chosen by local-
2government oﬃcials. Higher eﬀort reduces the per capita cost of providing any given z.E v e n
though this cost is constrained to equal the ﬁxed central transfer, the ability to adjust both z
and e means the locality gains discretion in the choice of z even though its spending level is
controlled.
Both z and e are chosen taking into account a separate “cost” of eﬀort, which does not
appear in the public accounts. Interpreting eﬀort as the education level of government oﬃcials,
this cost would represent the private cost incurred by these oﬃcials in educating themselves,
which is not covered by the central transfer.
In characterizing the public-sector equilibrium, the analysis relies on the modern formaliza-
tion of the Tiebout model, drawing in particular on the approach of Scotchmer and Wooders
(1986).2 Government oﬃcials are assumed to collaborate with community developers, who
build houses and sell them to consumers. The oﬃcials’ objective function equals developer
proﬁt, which depends on the attractiveness of the community and hence on the public-good
level z, minus their own cost of eﬀort. This “net proﬁt” objective would be appropriate if the
oﬃcials themselves played the role of developers, but it also applies in a case in which the
oﬃcials are separate entities but extract all the developer proﬁt via unmodeled taxes or per-
haps bribes. For simplicity, the combined entity composed of developers and their associated
government oﬃcials is referred to as a “locality” in the analysis.
In the model, Tiebout sorting occurs as localities, using their discretion in the choice of
public goods, tailor z to suit consumer preferences, which are assumed to be heterogeneous.
In addition, free entry of communities ensures that net proﬁt is zero in equilibrium. The
equilibrium public-good levels depend, of course, on the level of the central transfer.
The paper starts by considering two benchmarks against which partial decentralization
can be compared. The ﬁrst is full decentralization, under which localities can use freely-chosen
local taxes to ﬁnance public goods. The second is full central control, under which the central
government speciﬁes a ﬁxed z that each locality must deliver and provides the transfer to
ﬁnance it (implying a particular required eﬀort level). Note that, despite central control, z
must still be delivered locally, reﬂecting the nature of many public goods.
The ﬁrst result, which comes as no surprise given the structure of the model, is that partial
3decentralization is preferred to full central control as long as preferences are heterogeneous.
The reason is that full central control needlessly eliminates the variety in z made possible by
adjustment of eﬀort levels, which occurs despite the uniformity of the central transfer. Were
it feasible, full decentralization would in turn be preferred to partial decentralization since it
allows a fuller response to heterogeneous preferences. But with full decentralization ruled out
by the lack of local tax capacity, partial decentralization is the preferred ﬁscal arrangement.
This conclusion oﬀers an important practical lesson by showing that, in a setting where local-
ities have some discretion in choosing public-good levels despite a ﬁxed spending requirement,
the center should relinquish control of this decision, letting localities make their own z choices.
The analysis then compares patterns of public-good provision under partial and full decen-
tralization. The discussion shows that, when the central transfer under partial decentralization
is eﬃciently set at a “compromise” level that lies between the highest and lowest local taxes
charged under full decentralization, the dispersion of z levels narrows relative to the full de-
centralization case. In other words, relative to full decentralization, z rises for low demanders
and falls for high demanders under partial decentralization, a natural result. Despite this con-
clusion, the dispersion of eﬀort levels could narrow or widen relative to full decentralization
depending on the nature of preferences and costs.
Thus, while Tiebout sorting under partial decentralization generates a variety of public-
good levels, the variety that emerges is lower than under full decentralization, imposing a cost
on society. The analysis also explores how this variety comparison is aﬀected when localities
have the ability to levy a modest amount local taxes up to some cap. In this case, public-good
variety is only sacriﬁced at the extremes, with the middle of the z distribution the same as
under full decentralization. The foregoing analysis is presented in sections 2 and 3.
The discussion in section 4 then asks whether partial decentralization could sometimes be
the preferred institutional arrangement, rather than constituting best response to limitations
on local tax capacity. To this end, the model is modiﬁed to include a Leviathan motive on
the part of local oﬃcials, who derive enjoyment from spending tax money beyond any proﬁt
earned. Relying partly on numerical examples, it is shown that partial decentralization can
be superior to both full central control and full decentralization under this modiﬁcation. In
4such a case, partial decentralization would be the best arrangement even if unlimited local
tax capacity made full decentralization feasible. The analysis also brieﬂy considers the eﬀects
of other types of undesirable local behavior, including the laziness on the part of government
oﬃcials, which raises the cost of eﬀort beyond its resource cost, and the theft of tax revenue.
This paper adds to a recent resurgence of research on ﬁscal decentralization, which builds
on the classic treatment of Oates (1972). Recent papers include Lockwood (2002), Besley and
Coate (2003), Brueckner (2004) and Lorz and Willman (2005), among others (see Brueckner
(2004) for fuller references). In the models of Besley and Coate and Lockwood, the central
government is able to provide diﬀerent z’s across regions when it has the responsibility for
public-good provision, an outcome that would be analogous to allowing non-uniform transfers
in the present setup. While non-uniformity in these models is the result of a political struggle
between regions, non-uniform transfers would only appear to be appropriate in the present
model as a means of addressing income equalities, which are absent by assumption.
It is important to recognize that the analysis in this paper is not meant to be a deﬁni-
tive treatment of partial ﬁscal decentralization. Rather, the model is oﬀered as one possible
approach to this issue, with the goal of ending the literature’s near-complete silence on the
subject. In a rare related study, Schwager (1999) analyzes what he calls “administrative feder-
alism,” where the center sets quality standards for public projects executed by localities, and
further analysis of incomplete ﬁscal decentralization from yet other perspectives is needed.
2. Basic Model
As noted above, the per capita cost of public-good provision depends on the level of the
good, z, and on the eﬀort of government oﬃcials, e. The cost function is written C(z,e), with
Cz > 0a n dCe < 0, and the function is assumed to be strictly convex (subscripts denote partial
derivatives). Generally, per capita cost should depend on the population n of the community,
but this dependence is eliminated via the assumption of constant returns to population, which
means that the overall cost function is written nC(z,e).
For future reference, note that C comes from inverting an underlying public-good produc-
tion function, written as z = S(g,e), where g is the physical input and Se > 0. Inverting S
5with respect to the g input yields g = S−1(z,e), where S−1 is the appropriate inverse function.
With the price of g normalized to unity, C(z,e) ≡ S−1(z,e).
The cost of eﬀort by government oﬃcials, again expressed on per capita basis, is written
F(e), where F is a strictly convex, increasing function. This function is again independent of
community population, which means that the overall cost of eﬀort is nF(e). This setup follows
from assuming that the cost of eﬀort per oﬃcial is f(e), and that η oﬃcials are required per
capita, with F(e) ≡ ηf(e).
Developers build houses of a ﬁxed size, which are rented to consumers. The production cost
per house is denoted r, but this cost is normalized to zero for simplicity. The price commanded
by a house depends on the community’s public-good level, with this price given by the function
P(z), where P   > 0. This price function is ultimately endogenous but is viewed as parametric
by all agents in the economy, following the “price-taking” approach of Scotchmer and Wooders
(1986).3
The economy contains m types of consumers, with each having quasi-linear preferences
over z and consumption of a private good x. The utility function for type-j consumers is given
by x + Uj(z), but for expository convenience, the functions Uj are assumed to take the form
θjV (z), where V (·) is strictly concave. The θ parameters satisfy θ1 >θ 2 > ···>θ m,s ot h a t
consumer demand for z weakens as the taste index rises. Consumer incomes are identical and
equal to y.
2.1. Full decentralization
Consider now the case of full decentralization, the ﬁrst of the two benchmark regimes
considered in the analysis of partial decentralization. Under full decentralization, localities
levy their own taxes to pay for public goods, whose levels are freely chosen. For concreteness,
suppose that these taxes are property taxes, paid by the developer of each house. Conditional
on z and e, the tax payment per house is then C(z,e), which leaves a proﬁt for the developer
equal to P(z) − C(z,e).
The locality’s net proﬁt per capita, which equals developer proﬁt minus the cost of eﬀort,
6is given by
P(z) − C(z,e) − F(e) ≡ π, (1)
This expression constitutes the locality’s objective function. As explained above, (1) is appro-
priate if government oﬃcials are able to capture all the developer’s proﬁt through unmodeled
taxes or by soliciting bribes. Alternatively, the government oﬃcials themselves could function
as developers, so that the proﬁt portion of (1) accrues directly to them.
The locality maximizes (1) by choice of z and e, and the ﬁrst-order conditions are
P   − Cz =0 ( 2 )
−F   − Ce =0 . (3)
The ﬁrst condition says that z is optimal when the increment to the house price from a marginal
increase equals the marginal cost of z. The eﬀort choice is optimal when the tax reduction
−Ce allowed by higher eﬀort equals the marginal cost of eﬀort. The second-order condition
for maximization of (1) is assumed to hold.4
Consumers maximize utility by selecting a community of residence, a choice that reduces
to selecting z.A t y p e - i consumer maximizes x + θiV (z) subject to the budget constraint
x + P(z)=y, and the ﬁrst-order condition is
θiV   = P  . (4)
From the consumer’s point of view, z is optimal when marginal utility equals the incremental
rent from a marginally higher z.
To understand the model’s equilibrium, suppose for a moment that all consumers are of
type i. Then, each consumer demands the z level given by solution to (4), while localities
provide the z level given by the solution to (2)–(3). In equilibrium, these z values must be the
same, so that localities provide the public-good level demanded by consumers.
7This equivalence is ensured by the shape of the equilibrium price function, as illustrated
in Figure 1. To understand this claim, observe that consumer maximization requires tangency
between an indiﬀerence curve in (P,z) space and price function P(z), while net proﬁt maxi-
mization by localities requires a tangency between an iso-proﬁt locus and the price function.5
For equilibrium to obtain, these tangencies must occur at the same point, as seen in Figure
1. An equilibrium price function must have the proper shape to ensure this coincidence of
tangencies. While P(z) is shown as linear for simplicity, the function can take other forms.6
Coincident tangencies mean, of course that the indiﬀerence curve and iso-proﬁt locus must
be tangent to each other at the equilibrium point, which requires θiV   = Cz. Formally, this
condition comes from the requirement that (2) and (4) hold at the same value of z,w h i c h
allows the equations to be combined, eliminating P  . Together, this tangency condition along











A further equilibrium requirement, which comes from the assumption of free entry by
localities, is that net proﬁt equals zero. This requirement eﬀectively pins down the level of
the equilibrium price function, with its slope constrained by the double-tangency requirement.
With zero net proﬁt requiring P(z)=C(z,e)+F(e), private good consumption is then given
by x∗
i = y − P(z∗
i )=y − C(z∗
i,e ∗
i) − F(e∗
i), completing the determination of all the variables
in the model.
When multiple consumer types exist, each type maximizes conditional on P(z), yielding a
collectionof diﬀerent demanded z levels. All these levelsmust be provided by diﬀerent localities
in equilibrium, which requires a set of coincident indiﬀerence-curve/iso-proﬁt tangencies along
the price function. Since zero proﬁt is required in equilibrium, all these tangencies must then
lie on the zero-proﬁt locus. To generate this outcome, the equilibrium price function must
“thread” all the tangency points, passing through each one in the manner seen in Figure 1.7
8The key feature of this equilibrium is Tiebout sorting, with the various taste groups con-
suming diﬀerent public-good levels, z∗
j, j =1 ,...,M, in separate localities. These levels are
in turn provided using diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort, e∗
j, j =1 ,...,M, with all the solutions given
by the analog to (5)–(6) for the various taste groups. For future reference, let the resulting
public-good costs be denoted T∗
j = C(z∗
j,e ∗
j). Since public-good demand falls with index of




2.2. Full central control
The other benchmark regime, full central control, leaves localities no discretion in choosing
public-good and eﬀort levels. Under this arrangement, the central government collects a head
tax   T from each consumer, and then transfers this tax revenue to localities on an equal per
capita basis. In addition, the center mandates a common public-good level   z, which each
community is required to provide (  z must feasible given the available transfer). This mandate
then determines a required eﬀort level   e, which satisﬁes   T = C(  z,  e).
Under full central control, local taxes are absent, so that developer proﬁt is P(  z)a n dt h e
net proﬁt of each locality is P(  z) − F(  e). Free entry again must reduce net proﬁt to zero, so
that P(  z) − F(  e) = 0 holds and x = y −   T − F(  e). The outcome under full central control
depends on the chosen values of   T and   z, which are considered below.
2.3. Partial decentralization
The discussion now turns to the main focus of the analysis, the case of partial decentral-
ization. Under this regime, the center collects a head tax of   T, which is transferred to localities
on an equal per capita basis. However, in contrast to full central control, the center does not
mandate a particular public-good level, but instead leaves the choice of z up to the localities.
Local taxes are again absent, so that a locality’s net proﬁt equals P(z) − F(e). Net proﬁt is
now maximized subject to the constraint that   T exceeds or equals the public-good cost. Given
that eﬀort is costly, this constraint will bind in equilibrium, and it is written
  T = C(z,e). (7)
The key feature of the constraint in (7) is that a range of (z,e) combinations satisﬁes it, allowing
9localities discretion in the choice of public goods despite central control of their spending.
Letting λ denote the multiplier associated with the constraint, the Lagrangian expression
for maximization of net proﬁt is P(z) − F(e)+λ(  T − C(z,e)), and the ﬁrst-order conditions
are9
P   − λCz =0 ( 8 )
−F   − λCe =0 . (9)
In the case of a single consumer type, again denoted i, localities must provide the z level
demanded by that type. This equilibrium requirement again allows the P   term in (8) to
be replaced by θiV  , yielding θiV   = λCz. Thus, the equilibrium solutions for the partial
decentralization regime, denoted   zi,   ei,a n d  λi,s a t i s f y
θiV  (  zi)=  λiCz(  zi,  ei) (10)
F  (  ei)=−  λiCe(  zi,  ei) (11)
  T = C(  zi,  ei). (12)
In addition, the zero-proﬁt condition again yields   xi = y −P(  zi)=y −C(  zi,  ei)−F(  ei). Note
that all of the solutions are conditional on   T.
When multipleconsumer types exist, equilibrium conditions analogous to (10)–(12) emerge
for each type. Thus, as in the case of full decentralization, the equilibrium is characterized
by Tiebout sorting, with the various types consuming diﬀerent public-good levels in separate
localities. This outcome emerges even though each locality is required to spend the same
amount, a consequence of the ﬂexibility made possible by variable eﬀort.
A key task is to compare the public-good levels chosen under full and partial decentraliza-
tion. This task is undertaken below, following an eﬃciency comparison of the three diﬀerent
regimes.
103. Comparing Partial to Full Decentralization and Full Central Control
3.1. Eﬃciency comparisons
In comparing partial decentralization to the two benchmark regimes, it is useful to ﬁrst
make an eﬃciency comparison. The verdict is immediate given that progression from full
central control to partial decentralization to full decentralization involves successive relaxation
of constraints, implying increases in potential welfare. This point is demonstrated in the
ensuing discussion.
Welfare in the model equals total consumer utility plus the total net proﬁt of localities.
Since proﬁt is zero, welfare is simply total utility, written taking the zero-proﬁt constraint into





ρj[y − Tj − F(ej)+θiV (zj)], (13)
where
Tj = C(zj,e j),i =1 ,2,...,M. (14)
Under unrestricted welfare maximization, W is maximized treating zi, ei and Ti, i =
1,...,M, as choice variables, with the conditions in (14) treated as constraints. The ﬁrst-
order conditions are ρiθiV (zi)=µiCz, ρiF  = −µiCe,a n dµi = ρi. Since these conditions
reduce to the equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) under the full decentralization regime, full
decentralizationis welfare maximizing, reﬂectingthe usual Tiebout result for the present model.
By contrast, partial decentralization is captured by adding the constraints
Tj =   T, j=1 ,2,...,M, (15)
to the maximization problem in (13)–(14). It is again easily seen that the optimality conditions
for zi and ei in this restricted problem reduce to the equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) (see
the appendix). This equivalence shows that the partial decentralization equilibrium is eﬃcient
conditional on   T. Choosing the value of   T optimally then yields the best possible outcome for
this regime, and the relevant ﬁrst-order condition is discussed below.
11Finally, the regime with full central control is captured by replacing   T by   T in (15) and
adding the further constraints
zj =   z, j =1 ,2,...,M (16)
to the maximization problem (13)–(15).   T and   z c a nt h e nb ec h o s e no p t i m a l l y .
Since the progression between the above problems involves the successive addition of con-
straints, which reduce the maximal value of the objective function, the following conclusion
can be stated:
Proposition 1. If   T is chosen optimally, then welfare rises moving from full central
control to partial decentralization to full decentralization.
It is easily seen that, if the taste groups are identical, then this result is overturned, with the
same welfare achieved under the three diﬀerent regimes. Observe also that, if   T is not chosen
optimally, then the welfare comparison between full central control and partial decentralization
could be reversed.10
Proposition 1 implies that, if full decentralization is feasible under a country’s institutional
structure, it is the preferred regime. However, if limitations on local tax capacity require
revenue to be raised by the central government and then transferred to localities, these transfers
should occur under a regime of partial decentralization, where local spending autonomy is
permitted. The alternative of full central control, where the center provides transfers and
mandates public-good levels, is inferior to partial decentralization as long as the center can
identify the optimal   T or come close to it. Full central control needlessly restricts variety in
the provision of public goods, which emerges through adjustment of eﬀort levels under partial
decentralization despite the ﬁxed spending requirement.
3.2. The optimal   T
Further comparisons require a characterization of the optimal transfer level under partial
decentralization, which is derived by collapsing the welfare-maximization problem for that
regime into a simpler form. To do so,   T replaces Tj in (13) and (14), with the constraints in
12(15) dropped, yielding the Lagrangian expression
m  
j=1
ρj[y −   T − F(ej)+θiV (zj)] +
m  
j=1
µj[  T − C(zj,e j)] (17)






ρj =1 , (18)
which can be rewritten as
 m
j=1ρjθjV  (zj)/Cz(zj,e j) = 1 using the ﬁrst-order condition for
zj to eliminate µj (see the appendix). In this form, the optimality condition says that the
weighted average across consumer types of the ratio of z’s marginal utility to its marginal cost
must equal unity. The optimality conditions for full central control have a related form.11
Condition (18), though not intuitive, is useful in characterizing the magnitude of the
optimal   T, denoted   T∗. Recalling that T∗
i = C(z∗
i,e ∗
i) gives the public-good cost under full
decentralization, the following result (proved in the appendix) is useful:
Lemma 1. The multiplier µi satisﬁes µi > (=) <ρ i as   T<(=) >T∗
i , i =1 ,...,m.
For (18) to hold, the multiplierµi must be larger than the population share ρi for some i values
and smaller for others, and the lemma shows that the pattern depends on the relationship
between the T∗
i and   T. Since satisfaction of the inequality µi ≥ ρi for all i is ruled out, as is
satisfaction of µi ≤ ρi, the lemma then implies that   T ≤ T∗
i or   T ≥ T∗
i cannot hold for all i,
yielding
Proposition 2.   T∗ must satisfy T∗




m are the largest and smallest T∗
i ’s under full decentralization, the
proposition says that the optimal   T is bracketed by these minimal and maximal values, a
natural result.
13Although the optimal   T has been characterized, central governments do not possess the
information on preferences and costs required to compute such a value. Localities, by contrast,
in maximizing net proﬁt in response to an equilibriumprice function for housing, make optimal
choices even though they also lack information about consumer preferences. Nevertheless,
despite their lack of information, central governments might set   T in an approximately optimal
fashion. Indeed, it might be reasonable to suppose that the center would be able to select   T
with the same precision reﬂected in Proposition 2, setting   T somewhere between the maximal
and minimal T∗
i values under full decentralization. This kind of selection is referred to as a
“compromise choice” of   T.
Assuming that the center makes a compromise choice, the analysis next investigates the
distribution of z values under partial decentralization.
3.3. Comparing the distribution of z values under full and partial decentralization
With a compromise choice of   T, public-good costs rise for some consumer types and fall
for others, relative to the full decentralization regime. Finding the eﬀect on public-good levels
requires assessing the impact of   T on z, recognizing that T∗
i under full decentralization can be
treated as a particular value of   T.
To carry out this exercise, the equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) under partial decen-
tralization can be collapsed into the single condition
θiV  (  zi)
F  (  ei)
= −
Cz(  zi,  ei)
Ce(  zi,  ei)
. (19)
This condition, along with (12), determines   zi and   ei conditional on   T. Equivalently, the
equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) under full decentralization can be collapsed into an equation




analogous to (12), the full decentralization equilibrium values for locality i can be generated
under partial decentralization by setting   T equal to T∗
i . As a result, the impact of   T on   zi can
be used to compare the z values emerging under the two regimes.
Although comparative-static analysis of   T’s eﬀect is messy, insight is gained by considering
a diagram, as follows. The RHS of (19) is the slope of an iso-cost curve in (z,e) space, deﬁned
14by (12) and shown in Figure 2. Since a higher   T allows e to be reduced while holding z ﬁxed,
the locus shifts downward as   T increases. In addition, strict convexity of C implies that the
function is also strictly quasi-convex, so that the locus has the convex curvature shown in the
Figure.
The LHS of (19) is the slope of an indiﬀerence curve in (e,z) space, as deﬁned by y −
  T − F(e)+θiV (z)=u and shown in Figure 2. Note that the indiﬀerence curve is concave
because, as z and e increase moving along the curve, the numerator of the slope expression
falls while the denominator rises. Note also that slope at a given (e,z) point is independent
of the magnitude of   T. Thus, (19) characterizes a tangency between an iso-cost curve and an
indiﬀerence curve, as seen in the Figure.
When   T increases, the iso-cost curve shifts down, and a new tangency point is established.
The resulting direction of change for z depends on the changes in the slopes of the two curves
moving vertically downward from the original tangency. First, note that, since F   > 0, a
decline in e with z held ﬁxed raises the indiﬀerence-curve slope. However, the change in
the slope of the iso-cost curve is ambiguous, making the change in z ambiguous in general.
But if the physical input g into public good production is normal, in the sense that its cost-
minimizing level rises as the target amount of z output increases, then the iso-cost curve slope
ﬂattens moving vertically downward (see the appendix for a proof). With the indiﬀerence
curve steepening, and the curves respectively convex and concave, the tangency must then
move to the right, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, an increase in   T raises   zi. However, as should
be clear from the Figure, nothing general can be said about the direction of the change for   ei.
This discussion establishes
Lemma 2. If the physical input into public-good production is normal, then an increase
in   T raises   zj for all j.
The normality property in the lemma will henceforth be a maintained assumption.
For a type-i consumer, moving from the full decentralization regime to partial decentral-
ization can be viewed as a change in   T from a value of T∗
i to the whatever value prevails under
the latter regime. A compromise choice, which sets   T at a value   T#, can then be viewed as an
15increase in   T for consumer types with T∗
i <   T#,w h o s ez values under full decentralization are
low, and a decrease in   T for types with T∗
i >   T#,w h o s ez values are high. From the lemma,
these changes in turn yield increases and decreases, respectively, in z.T h u s ,
Proposition 3. A compromise choice of   T under partial decentralization narrows the
dispersion of z levels relative to full decentralization case.
This result, which is a natural conclusion, shows that the consequences of Tiebout sorting
are muted under partial decentralization. Since public-good costs are constrained to be equal
across localities, partial decentralization reduces the variety in available z levels. However,
some variety is still available, a key conclusion that makes partial decentralization superior to
full central control.
Although the eﬀect of partial decentralization on the dispersion of eﬀort levels is ambiguous
in general, a clear impact emerges under speciﬁc functional forms. In particular, if the z
production function is Cobb-Douglas, with z = g1/αeβ/α (yielding C(z,e)=zαe−β), if V (z)=
zδ,a n di fF(e)=eγ, then the solution to (19) and (12) shows that both   zi and   ei are increasing
in   T. As a result, following the above logic, partial decentralization narrows the dispersion of
both z and e levels relative to the full decentralization regime.
3.4. The eﬀect of allowing limited local tax capacity
Suppose realistically that, instead of relying entirely on central transfers, localities have
limited taxing ability, being allowed to a levy local (property) tax t up to a per capita limit
of t. In this case, a locality’s net proﬁt is P(z) − t − F(e), which is maximized subject
to the constraints t ≥ 0, t ≥ t,a n d  T + t = C(z,e). The Lagrangian expression is thus
P(z) −t− F(e)+λ(  T + t− C(z,e))+ νt+ τ(t−t). The ﬁrst-order conditions for z and e are
again (8) and (9), and the t condition is
−1+λ + ν − τ =0 . (20)
If the constraints on t are not binding, then ν = τ = 0 and hence λ = 1 .E q s .( 8 )
and (9) then reduce to the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) for the full decentralization case,
16ultimately yielding the equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) for any consumer type where the
constraints on the local tax are not binding. This conclusion is natural: free adjustment of
local taxes on top of a ﬁxed transfer allows public spending to be freely chosen, just as in the
full decentralization case. However, if one of the constraints on t binds, the outcome for that
consumer type mirrors the original partial decentralization regime.
With a suﬃcient range of demands for z in the population, a small enough cap t,a n da
compromise choice of   T, the nonnegativity constraint on t will bind for the lowest public-good
demanders and the upper cap will bind for highest demanders. For moderate demanders,
choice of t will be unconstrained. Applying the logic of section 2.3 then yields
Proposition 4. Under partial decentralization with local taxes, suppose   T is set so that
the constraint t ≥ 0 binds for at least one low-z-demand consumer and the constraint
t ≥ t binds for at least one high-demand consumer. Chosen z levels are then higher
(lower) than under full centralization for these constrained low (high) demanders, with
the z distribution compressed at the top and bottom. For unconstrained individuals,
chosen z’s match those under full decentralization.
It is also interesting to consider the eﬃcient choice of   T in the presence of local taxes. The
Lagrangian for the welfare maximization problem is
 
ρj[y−F(ej)−  T −tj−θjV (zj)] +
 





As before, the ﬁrst-order conditions for zi and ei under partial decentralization match the








j∈A ρj,w h e r eA is the set of constrained consumers. Recognizing that the set
A contains those individuals with the maximal and minimal values of T∗
i and repeating the
previous logic, it follows that Proposition 2 continues to hold. Moreover, using the ﬁrst-order
condition for zi to eliminateµi,t h e  T condition can be written as
 
j∈A ρjθjV  (zj)/Cz(zj,e j)=
 
j∈Aρj, indicating that only the preferences of individuals in the constrained group matter
in the determination of   T. The preferences of the unconstrained demanders in the middle of
the distribution, who have eﬀective local control over public spending, are not considered.12
174. Adding Local Leviathan Behavior
4.1. Basic analysis
In analysis so far, full decentralization is always preferred, although it may not be feasible
due to limitations on local tax capacity. In this case, the partial decentralization regime is the
best available option. This section of the paper modiﬁes the model in a way that reduces the
attractiveness of full decentralization, possibly making partial decentralization the preferred
arrangement even in the absence of any limits on local tax capacity. The modiﬁcation consists
of Leviathan behavior on the part of local oﬃcials, which is captured by assuming that the
oﬃcials receive a utility equal to φC(z,e) from spending on public goods, over and above the
locality’s net proﬁt.
In the case of full decentralization, net locality proﬁt plus Leviathan utility equals P(z)−
C(z,e) − F(e)+φC(z,e). In this case, the Cz and Ce terms in (2) and (3), the ﬁrst-order
conditions for the locality’s maximization problem, are multiplied by the factor 1 − φ,a n d
previous type-i equilibrium conditions, (5) and (6), are replaced by
θiV  (z∗∗




i )=−(1 − φ)Ce(z∗∗
i ,e ∗∗
i ), (23)
where the double asterisks indicate equilibrium values with Leviathan behavior. Note that
such behavior reduces the perceived marginal cost of z as well as the perceived cost savings





denote the public-good cost under full decentralization.
To evaluate the eﬃciency of this equilibrium, consider the welfare maximization problem.
The utility for a type-i consumer is y−P(zi)−Ti+θiV (zi), and net proﬁt plus Leviathan utility
for i’s locality equals P(zi)−F(ei)+φTi. While summing yields y−Ti−F(ei)+θiV (zi)+φTi,
the social planner does not treat Leviathan utility as a social return and thus subtracts it in
reaching a ﬁnal welfare measure for locality i, which then equals W = y−Ti−F(ei)+θiV (zi),
18with Ti = C(zi,e i). Multiplyingby ρi and summing across i, the welfare maximization problem
is thus identical to the problem given by (13) and (14).
Given this fact, Lemma 1 can be used to compare T∗∗
i from (24) to the socially optimal Ti,
which equals the eﬃcient equilibrium value T∗
i in the basic model. The following result can be
established (see the appendix):
Proposition 5. T∗∗
j >T ∗
j holds for all j, so that public-good cost for each consumer
type under full decentralization exceeds the socially optimal level. As a result, z∗∗
j >z ∗
j
also holds for all j, so that public goods are overprovided.
These results are, of course, natural ones given Leviathan behavior.
Turning to the partial decentralization regime under Leviathan behavior, a locality’s La-
grangian expression is given by P(z) − F(e)+φ  T + λ(  T − C(z,e)). It is easily seen that
the resulting ﬁrst-order and equilibrium conditions are unchanged, being given by (8)–(9) and
(10)–(12) respectively. Leviathan behavior thus has no eﬀect on the equilibrium z and e values
under partial decentralization, conditional on   T. Moreover, given that the welfare maximiza-
tion problem is unchanged, it remains true that the partial decentralization equilibrium is
eﬃcient conditional on   T. The magnitude of   T∗, the optimal value of   T, is also unchanged.
Given these facts, Proposition 2 continues to hold. But since the eﬃcient T∗
i values in
the proposition are no longer equilibrium values under full decentralization, the comparison
of   T∗ to the equilibrium values (T∗∗
i ,i =1 ,2,,...,m) is disrupted. Using Proposition 5, the
following more-limited result emerges:
Proposition 6.   T∗ satisﬁes T∗∗
1 >   T∗,b u t  T∗ can be larger or smaller than T∗∗
m .
Thus   T∗ is no longer bracketed by the largest and smallest equilibrium Ti values under full
decentralization. Since the distribution of these values shifts to the right, the smallest value
may no longer be smaller than   T∗.
If the center’s choice of   T under partial decentralization is approximately optimal, so
that it falls short of T∗∗
1 ,t h e nz values will be lower than under full decentralization for
the highest-demand consumers (those with T∗∗
j >   T). If   T>T ∗∗
m holds in addition, then
19partial decentralization will raise z values for the lowest-demand consumers, preserving the
compression property of the basic model, as stated in Proposition 3. However, if   T<T ∗∗
m
holds, then partial decentralization will reduce the z’s of all consumers.
4.2. Welfare comparisons
While full decentralization was unambiguously superior to partial decentralization in the
basic model, a diﬀerent conclusion emerges under Leviathan behavior. To explore this question,
it is useful to start by considering a model with a single consumer type, denoted i.I n t h i s
case, W = y − Ti − F(ei)+θiV (zi). Maximizing with respect to all three variables subject to
Ti = C(zi,e i), the conditions θiV   = Cz and F  = −Ce characterize the social optimum. These
conditions are satisﬁed under partial decentralization when   T is set equal to T∗
i and (trivially)
satisﬁed under full central control when   T = T∗
i and zi = z∗
i. Thus, with one consumer type,
these two regimes are equivalent and both can generate the full social optimum. By contrast,
welfare under full decentralization is lower, a consequence of the Leviathan distortion.
Although full decentralization is inferior with a single consumer type, consumer hetero-
geneity complicates the welfare comparison. In this case, movement from full central control to
partial decentralization is welfare improving because control over T can still restrain Leviathan
behavior, while localities gain discretion over z. Further movement to full decentralization,
however, has both positive and negative eﬀects: localities gain even more discretion to respond
to consumer public-good demands, but their Leviathan tendencies are unrestrained. These
considerations indicate that partial decentralization may be superior to full decentralization in
some situations and not in others. Intuition would suggest that, if the strength of Leviathan
motive (as measured by the size of φ) is large relative to the dispersion of z demands, then the
negative eﬀect of moving to full decentralization would dominate the positive eﬀect, making
partial decentralization preferable. The outcome would be reversed, making full decentral-
ization preferable, when demand dispersion is high relative to the strength of the Leviathan
motive.
To evaluate these predictions, numerical examples are computed using the functional-form
assumptions at the end of section 3. Parameter values are α =1 .5,β=0 .4,δ=0 .75,
γ =1 ,a n dφ =0 .25. The population has two equal-size groups, whose θ values are varied in
20generating the examples. Table 1 shows welfare levels and T, z,a n de values for three diﬀerent
combinations of the demand parameters (θ1,θ 2), which reﬂect increasing demand dispersion:
(4.5, 3.5), (5,3), and (6,2). Note that since the mean θ always equals 4, the solution under full
central control is the same in each case.
In the ﬁrst panel of Table 1, where demand dispersion is low, partial decentralization is
the preferred regime. Its welfare level (103.30) exceeds welfare under both full central control
(103.28) and full decentralization (102.50). Note that while T∗∗
1 (17.45) exceeds   T (5.51),
following Proposition 6, T∗∗
2 (7.55) is also larger than   T.A s a r e s u l t , b o t h z1 and z2 are
lower under partial than under full decentralization, a comparison that also applies to eﬀort
levels. The second panel, where demand dispersion is somewhat higher, shows the same welfare
comparison between the regimes. However,   T (5.61) is now greater than T∗∗
2 (4.52), with the
result that the z and e distributions under partial decentralization are compressed relative to
full centralization, as in the basic model.
In the third panel of Table 1, demand dispersion is yet greater, but now the welfare
ranking of the regimes diﬀers, with full decentralization (W = 104.67) preferred to partial
decentralization (W = 103.65). The T, z and e comparisons, however, follow the pattern of
the second panel. The welfare reversal seen in these results matches the predictions of intuition,
yielding
Proposition 7. With Leviathan behavior, partial decentralization may be preferred
to both full central control and full decentralization. This outcome may obtain when
public-good demand dispersion is low relative to the strength of the Leviathan motive.
2.3. Other undesirable behavior by localities
Other typesof undesirable behavior on the part of localitiescan be envisioned. For example,
local government oﬃcials could steal a portion of tax or transfer revenue, with the proceeds
adding to their utility. However, it is easily seen that this behavior is self-defeating. The
reason is that the theft reduces public-good output, which in turn lowers developer proﬁts by
depressing house prices. Thus, since the gain from theft is exactly oﬀset by in a drop in proﬁt,
oﬃcials have no incentive practice it.
21Laziness on the part of oﬃcials might be another distortion. This behavior could be
modeled by appending a coeﬃcient ξ>1 to the eﬀort cost function F. The extra cost (ξ−1)F
could represent a subjective dislike of eﬀort on the part of oﬃcials that is not recognized as a
social cost by the planner. In contrast to Leviathan behavior, laziness distorts outcomes under
both partial and full decentralization, making full central control potentially the preferred
regime. Numerical results conﬁrm this prediction when demand dispersion is low or ξ large,
but they also show that partial decentralization is now worse than both the other regimes,
an apparent consequence of its inability to curb laziness and its allowance for only limited
discretion in public-good provision.
5. Conclusion
The ﬁscal decentralization impulse now sweeping the world often leads to partial decentral-
ization, where subnational governments are funded by central transfers, rather than leading
to full local autonomy. When it occurs, the choice of partial ﬁscal decentralization is often
dictated by a lack of subnational tax capacity. Despite the practical important of this ar-
rangement, the existing literature contains no economic analysis of a partial decentralization
regime. This paper has provided such an analysis, relying on the key assumption that public-
good provision requires eﬀort on the part of government oﬃcials. By choosing diﬀerent degrees
of eﬀort, localities can provide diﬀerent public-good levels even when a ﬁxed, common transfer
constrains them to spend the same amount.
The paper shows that, as long as the transfer under partial decentralization can be chosen
in a close-to-optimal fashion, that regime is superior to full central control, where the center
dictates common public-good levels along with a ﬁxed amount of spending. This conclusion
provides a key practical lesson: when localities are able to adjust public-good levels despite
a ﬁxed spending requirement, the center should relinquish control of this decision, allowing
localities to make their own z choices.
The analysis also shows that public-good variety is lower under partial decentralization
than under the preferred but infeasible full decentralization regime, muting the consequences
of Tiebout sorting. However, if localities can complementthe ﬁxed central transfer with limited
22local tax revenue, constrained by a cap, then public-good variety is constrained only for high
and low demanders, with the center of the distribution unaﬀected relative to full decentraliza-
tion. Finally, Leviathan behavior on the part of local oﬃcials leads to overspending under full
decentralization, so that partial decentralization may become the preferred arrangement even
when full decentralization is institutionally feasible.
Given the practical importance of partial decentralization in the world-wide movement to
ﬁscal decentralization, the kind of analysis presented in this paper oﬀers a needed complement
to the existing Tiebout literature. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the present
approach oﬀers only one possible perspective on partial decentralization. Further development
of realistic models designed to give insight into this important ﬁscal arrangement deserves high
priority.
23Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
The (zi,e i) choice in maximization of (17) can be treated as a separate problem for each
consumer type i. Accordingly, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the type-i problem are
ρiθiV  (zi) − µiCz(zi,e i)=0 ( a1)
−ρiF (ei) − µiCe(zi,e i)=0 ( a2)
  T − C(zi,e i)=0 . (a3)
Note that (a1) and (a2) are equivalent to the equilibrium conditions under partial decen-
tralization, with the multipliers related by a proportionality factor. This fact establishes the
eﬃciency of the partial decentralization equilibrium, conditional on   T. As noted in section 3.1,
µi = ρi must hold when   T = T∗
i ,i nw h i c hc a s e( a1) and (a2) reduce to the type-i optimality
conditions under full decentralization, given by (5) and (6).






ρiθiV    − µiCzz −µiCze −Cz




⎠ > 0. (a4)
The next step is to derive the impact of an increase in   T on the value of the multiplier µi.
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From above, the value of ∂µi/∂  T when   T = T∗




ze + F   (Czz − θiV   )+F   Czz]/H < 0, (a6)
24given the maintained assumptions on the functions C, F and V .W i t h b o t h µi = ρi and
∂µi/∂  T<0 holding when   T = T∗
i , it follows that µi > (=) <ρ i as   T<(=) >T∗
i , establishing
the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The lemma is established by showing that the iso-cost slope ﬂattens moving downward in









































If g is a normal input, then the absolute z-isoquant slope in (g,e) space, given by Sg/Se,
increases moving vertically (toward higher e values), requiring See−SegSe/Sg < 0.13 Eq. (a9)
then implies that iso-cost slope rises as e increases holding z ﬁxed, establishing the desired
result.
Positivity of (a9) also implies that T∗
i rises with θi, as asserted earlier. This conclusion
comes from total diﬀerentiation of (5)–(6) to compute ∂T∗
i /∂θi = Cz(∂z∗
i/∂θi)+Ce(∂e∗
i/∂θi).
The resulting expression has the same sign as CzF    +CzCee−CeCze, and while the ﬁrst term
is positive, the diﬀerence between the last two terms is also positive given positivity of (a9).
25Proof of Proposition 5.
The equilibrium system (22)–(24) is equivalent to the system (a1)–(a3) with µi <ρ i and
  T = T∗∗
i . Therefore using Lemma 1, it follows that T∗∗
i >T ∗
i . While (19) was used above
to compare z levels in the full and partial decentralization regimes, the equation can also be
used to compare z’s in the full decentralization cases with and without Leviathan behavior,
given that φ cancels in combining (22) and (23). This fact means that the z diﬀerence between
the two cases is determined entirely by the diﬀerent in Ti values. Using Lemma 2 along with
T∗∗
i >T∗
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Figure 2: The effect of T on z and e Table 1
Numerical Examples
full partial full
decentralization decentralization central control
θ1 =4 .5
θ2 =3 .5
W 102.50 103.30 103.28
T∗∗
1 17.45 – –
T∗∗
2 7.55 – –
  T∗ or   T∗ – 5.51 5.47
z1 10.46 4.00 3.83
z2 4.79 3.68 3.83
e1 5.24 2.55 2.19
e2 2.26 1.86 2.19
θ1 =5
θ2 =3
W 102.93 103.37 103.28
T∗∗
1 24.79 – –
T∗∗
2 4.52 – –
  T∗ or   T∗ – 5.62 5.47
z1 14.52 4.21 3.83
z2 2.96 3.55 3.83
e1 7.44 2.94 2.19
e2 1.36 1.55 2.19
θ1 =6
θ2 =2
W 104.67 103.65 103.28
T∗∗
1 45.53 – –
T∗∗
2 1.17 – –
  T∗ or   T∗ – 6.08 5.47
z1 25.60 4.78 3.83
z2 0.84 3.32 3.83
e1 13.66 3.88 2.19
e2 0.35 0.98 2.19
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28Footnotes
∗I thank Kangoh Lee for helpful discussions. Any shortcomings in the paper, however, are
my responsibility.
1The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Poland,
South Africa, and Uganda.
2See also Berglas and Pines (1980).
3The alternate “utility-taking” approach to analysis of local public-good provision is exem-
pliﬁed by Berglas (1976).
4This condition requires positivity of Hessian determinant of (1), or −(P  −Czz)(Cee+F   )−
C2
ze > 0.
5The indiﬀerence curve with utility u is deﬁned by y−P +θiV (z)=u,o rP = y−u+θiV (z),
an increasing and strictly concave function in (P,z) space. An iso-proﬁt locus is deﬁned by
max{e}[P −C(z,e)−F(e)] = π. Using the envelope theorem, ∂P/∂z = Cz,a n d∂2P/∂z2 =
Czz + Cze(∂e/∂z)=CzzCee − C2
ze + CzzF    > 0.
6The equilibrium price function is not unique. Any function that “threads” the tangency
point between an indiﬀerence curve and zero-proﬁt locus is an equilibrium function.
7See Brueckner (2000) for a diagram of this type based on a somewhat diﬀerent model.
8These relationships hold under a weak assumption introduced below.
9The second-order conditions, which now involve a bordered Hessian determinant, are as-
sumed to hold.
10Note that optimal choice of   T and   z is not required in Proposition 1. Provided   T is optimal,
full central control is inferior to partial decentralization when these variables are chosen
optimally, and the outcome is even worse otherwise.
11The optimality conditions for the uniform z and e levels under full central control are  
ρjθjV  (z)=Cz(z,e)a n dF (e)=Ce(z,e). The optimal values are denoted   z∗ and
29  e∗,a n d  T∗ ≡ C(  z∗,  e∗).
12It should be recognized that the makeup of the constrained groups itself depends on the
magnitude of   T, a subtlety that is implicit in the above discussion.
13The cost-minimizingg then increases as the target levelof z output rises, assuming a constant
“price” per unit of eﬀort.
30